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Abstract
Data privacy is an increasingly important issue in the world today. People are
increasingly aware of, and concerned about, their digital footprint. As a result,
many jurisdictions around the world—the United States excluded—have enacted
legislation with an eye towards giving their citizens greater control over their
data. However, the movement to give individuals greater control over how their
data is used by tech providers often overlooks the fact that the government is
one of the biggest consumers of the data that tech providers collect. Therefore,
data privacy regimes that allow the flow of personal information to the
government do not meaningfully protect individual privacy. As the people of the
United States continue to debate how to best safeguard their personal
information, they should be mindful of how law enforcement demand for their
information can undermine those efforts.
This note begins by observing how the current legal framework in the United
States is ill equipped to deal with the privacy issues of an increasingly digital
world. Then, it examines the impact that data privacy legislation in China and
Europe has had on the relationship between tech companies and law
enforcement. Finally, by applying the lessons learned in China and Europe, this
note attempts to predict how efforts to protect consumers’ data privacy may
work in the United States. Ultimately, this note argues that, because law
enforcement in the United States is reliant on the data collected by the private
sector, meaningful data privacy reform is likely impossible unless it applies to
both the private sector and government equally.
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INTRODUCTION
All around the world, governments are trying to play catch up and
respond to the privacy implications of the swift expansion of an economy
based on monetizing users’ personal data. Not only are more people than
ever connected to one another, it is also a near impossibility for individuals
to live in today’s world without their personal data being collected and used
by a third party down the road. As a result, governments around the world
have been compelled to amend or craft new law to give their citizens better
control over how their data is used by third parties. At the same time, those
same governments, also with the goal of protecting their citizens, are
actively encroaching on the very same privacy interests to further their law
enforcement and national security goals.
Much of the current discussion regarding data privacy focuses on how
tech providers such as Google and Facebook collect and monetize our data.
The focus of this note is, instead, how law enforcement uses that data. As
we will see, there is not necessarily a bright line separating the two spheres.
An entire industry has emerged that monetizes personal data by selling law
enforcement services to government. But, as a general matter, the recent
trend of governments expanding personal data privacy protections is
antithetical to the desires of law enforcement to get their hands on as much
of that personal data as possible.
At first glance, it may seem that the use of personal data by private
actors in a commercial context is entirely separate from the government’s
use of personal data. However, this note will argue that they are
inextricably linked, and that modern law enforcement and government
surveillance necessarily rely on the broad collection and processing of user
data by private actors. As discussed below, this includes everything from
social media to an individual’s shopping history. Just as individual people
have come to rely on these things in their day to day lives, so have
governments. In effect, private collection of user data is the faucet from
which law enforcement drinks.
This note will analyze the dynamic between the government’s attempts
to protect the data privacy of its citizens from private actors while law
enforcement agencies are simultaneously collecting as much of that same
information as possible. This note will employ a comparative approach by
contrasting different data privacy and surveillance schemes in the United
States to the schemes in the European Union and China.
Part II of this article will discuss in some detail the current privacy law
in the United States and how it has enabled law enforcement to build an
expansive surveillance framework. Part III examines current privacy law
innovations in the European Union and China with an eye towards how that
legislation can thwart government law enforcement goals. In Part VI, this
article will examine the impact these different privacy schemes have on
private tech providers. This article then concludes with a discussion of what
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impact privacy law will have going forward in this area.
UNITED STATES

II.

A. Privacy Law
The United States, unlike the European Union or even China, has not
enacted any broad data privacy legislation.1 Unfortunately, this means that
understanding United States privacy law is not as simple as just looking up
the relevant statute. Any discussion of the privacy law landscape in the
United States necessarily requires a careful examination of the underlying
case law and its history. To the extent statutory legal protection exists, it is
in the form of sector-specific legislation that applies only to specific
industries such as healthcare and financial services.2 The U.S. Constitution
does not provide a fundamental right of data privacy; to the extent such a
constitutional right exists in the United States it has developed through case
law.3
These privacy rights, where they do exist, are ill suited to deal with
twenty-first century data privacy concerns. Privacy rights found in the U.S.
Constitution are generally derived from the Fourth Amendment prohibition
on “unreasonable searches and seizures” and place restrictions on state, not
private, conduct.4 In the physical world, the scope of the protections offered
by the Fourth Amendment are fairly easily defined and understood by
applying an inside/outside test where the “entering [of] enclosed spaces
ordinarily constitutes a search that triggers the Fourth Amendment.”5
Alternatively, where a person is out in the open, where there is no
“reasonable expectation of privacy,” the Fourth Amendment does not
operate.6
In the context of the internet and data stored electronically, the
inside/outside test fails us.7 Further, much of our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence fails to protect electronically stored data. The biggest factor is
the “third-party doctrine,” the Fourth Amendment rule that a person forfeits
their Fourth Amendment rights with regards to information that they
disclose to a third party.8 The third-party doctrine has been roundly
1

Nicholas F. Palmieri III, Data Protection in an Increasingly Globalized World, 94
IND. L.J. 297, 306 (2019).
2
Id. at 323.
3
Id.
4
See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General
Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1017 (2010).
5
Id. at 1010.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 1012.
8
Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563
(2009).
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criticized by commentators and state Supreme Courts alike.9 A strict
application of the third-party doctrine to the modern day leads to an absurd
result: no person has a “reasonable expectation of privacy” for any
information stored with a provider.10 This simply cannot be the case.
The U.S. Supreme Court, since establishing the third-party doctrine in
Smith v. Maryland,11 has shown some appetite for narrowing the scope of
the doctrine as it applies to electronically stored data.12 To the extent that
the pendulum has started to swing away from the third-party doctrine, the
phenomenon is most on display in Carpenter v. United States. In
Carpenter, the Court ruled that law enforcement needed a warrant in order
to obtain a person’s cell site location information—information about the
location of a cell phone each time it connects to a cell site—from the cell
phone service provider.13
The Fourth Amendment protections do not extend to a general right of
privacy.14 The right to be “left alone” and free from intrusion into one’s
personal affairs by other persons is left to the law of other states.15 To that
end, California is the first state that has passed legislation in this area: The
California Consumer Privacy Act which, in many ways, mirrors the
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).16 Much
like the GDPR, as discussed below, it is not yet clear what effect the CCPA
will have. However, it is likely that, as a state law, it will be less effective at
curbing the surveillance efforts of the federal government.
B. Government Access to Personal Data
In February 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments in United
States v. Microsoft,17 a case that sought to answer the question of whether
or not the United States government could compel an American email
service provider to comply with a warrant under the Stored
Communications Act (SCA)18 for material under the provider’s control
9

Id. at 564.
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2262 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
11
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-45 (1979) (“[A] person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”).
12
See e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (“The fact that technology now
allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information
any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought.”).
13
Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2221.
14
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (there is no “general
‘constitutional right to privacy’”).
15
Id. at 350-51.
16
See DataGuidance and Future of Privacy Forum, Comparing Privacy Laws: GDPR v.
CCPA, FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM (Nov. 2018), https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/11/GDPR_CCPA_Comparison-Guide.pdf.
17
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S.Ct. 1186 (2018).
18
18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2010).
10
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where the provider has decided to store the material abroad. The SCA,
enacted in 1986, provides authority for the government to compel a
communications service provider to disclose content of materials stored
electronically responsive to a court order.19 The SCA did not contemplate
the present-day reality that such information is often stored on servers all
over the world.
The lower court in Microsoft, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
held that the SCA did not allow the government to compel a provider to
produce content responsive to a court order.20 However, a Pennsylvania
District Court ruled contrary to the Second Circuit’s holding in Microsoft in
a similar case involving information stored by Google.21 Google
Pennsylvania was distinguishable from Microsoft as the two providers used
different underlying cloud models. The storage method used by Microsoft,
known as data localization, is where a provider stores information in a
cloud “that is restricted to a single country or region.”22 The method used
by Google, known as data shard storage, is where a provider “operates a
cloud network that ‘automatically moves data from one location on
Google’s network to another.’”23
Under the SCA as it existed when these cases were decided, without
the authority to compel disclosure via court order, the U.S. government
would have to go through diplomatic channels and request the information
through the government where the data was stored. In the case of Microsoft,
this was straightforward enough; the server was located in Ireland so the
United States would have to petition the Irish government to compel
Microsoft to comply with the court order. As we will see, this was, and
remains, an imperfect procedure, but there was at least a framework in
place to deal with these issues.
The data shard storage used in Google Pennsylvania complicated the
government’s ability to avail itself of this diplomatic option. Data shard
storage involves constantly moving data around between servers, and, as a
result, it may be impossible for Google to know exactly where the physical
location of a particular content is at any given time. Therefore, the
government cannot submit a request with a foreign state because it is
impossible to know which state to ask. Further, it is also possible for the
19
See id. § 2703(a) (“A governmental entity may require the disclosure . . . pursuant to a
warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure . .
. by a court of competent jurisdiction.”).
20
In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded sub nom. United States
v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018).
21
In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-01, 232 F. Supp. 3d 708 (E.D. Pa. 2017)
(“Google Pennsylvania”), aff’d, 275 F. Supp. 3d 605 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
22
Paul M. Schwartz, Legal Access to the Global Cloud, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1696
(2018).
23
Id. at 1695.
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“shards” that make up the content in question to be stored in many different
places at once. Effectively, if the government could not compel Google, or
any provider using data shard storage, to produce content responsive to a
court order under the SCA, there may not have been another option.24
Given the discord on the issue within a single circuit, and indeed
throughout the country, this was clearly a question that needed to be
answered. Before the Court could rule in Microsoft, Congress enacted the
Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act as part of an over
2,000-page omnibus budget bill.25 The CLOUD Act was passed with the
support of many cloud storage providers, including Microsoft and Google.26
The CLOUD Act contained two main parts. The first part amended the
SCA and provided the government with the authority to compel compliance
with a warrant in cases where the subscriber was in the United States and
the production of responsive material would happen in the United States.
This answered the question before the Court in Microsoft, and the case was
dismissed as moot.27
There is little question that it was necessary to amend the SCA.28 The
SCA itself was enacted because technology had begun to outpace the law.
Before the SCA, there was little protection for electronic information stored
with third parties. The Fourth Amendment, because of the third-party
doctrine, afforded little protection.29 Congress, by enacting the SCA, was
acknowledging that, as technology changed, so too must the law. With that
in mind, it is almost hard to believe that it took another thirty-three years
before Congress addressed the issue again. It is also alarming that, when
they finally did take up the issue, they passed the CLOUD Act in a rush,
tacked onto a 2,232-page omnibus budget bill without review by a
committee in either house.30
The CLOUD Act also went a step further than simply amending the
SCA to solve the extraterritorial issue in Microsoft. The second part
24
25

25.

Google Pennsylvania, 232 F. Supp. 3d at 723-25.
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348, 1212-

26
Letter from Apple, Google, Microsoft, & Oath to Sens. Orinn Hatch, Christopher
Coons, Lindsey Graham, & Sheldon Whitehouse (Feb. 6, 2018), https://blogs.microsoft.com/
datalaw/wp-content/uploads/sites/149/2018/02/Tech-Companies-Letter-of-Support-forSenate-CLOUD-Act-020618.pdf [hereinafter, Letter from Apple, Google, Microsoft].
27
After the enactment of the CLOUD Act, the government served Microsoft with a new
warrant under that authority. The Court remanded the case back to the Second Circuit with
instructions to dismiss the case as moot. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1188
(2018).
28
See Christine Galvagna, The Necessity of Human Rights Legal Protections in Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty Reform, 9 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. 57, 58 (2019).
29
See Kerr, supra note 8.
30
See David Ruiz, Responsibility Deflected, the CLOUD Act Passes, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/03/responsibility-deflectedcloud-act-passes.
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empowered the Attorney General to enter into executive agreements with
foreign countries, lifting the blocking provisions in the SCA on a countryby-country basis.31 It is the second part of the CLOUD Act that has the
greatest privacy implications.
Part two of the CLOUD Act allows the Attorney General to enter into
such agreements only when the other country’s law “affords robust and
procedural protections for privacy and civil liberties in light of the data
collection and activities that the foreign government that will be subject to
the agreement.”32 The CLOUD Act includes a non-exhaustive list of factors
that the Attorney General should consider, such as prohibitions against
torture and fair trial rights, but does not make any of the factors mandatory,
or otherwise assign weight to any of the factors.
Further, the ability to review or oversee the implementation of
agreements made under the CLOUD Act is, simply put, non-existent. The
Attorney General is charged with drafting, entering, and maintaining the
agreements. The Act does include a provision that the foreign government
must agree to a periodic review by the United States government.33
However, there is no requirement that the U.S. government actually
conduct such review. Further, even if such review were to be conducted, it
would not necessarily be conducted by the Attorney General.
There is no mechanism for the content of the agreements to be
disclosed. The first country that the United States has entered an agreement
with is the United Kingdom. The U.S. government declined to release a
draft of the agreement prior to its ratification and did not release the content
of the agreement afterwards. There have been reports that other countries
have discussed entering into such agreements with the United States, but
there are few publicly available details.34 There are some parallels to this
such as the secret treaty that formed the basis of the United States-United
Kingdom spy alliance that led to the creation of the Five Eyes alliance: the
intelligence alliance comprised of the United States, United Kingdom,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.35 Given the general distrust of the
international community regarding the actions of the United States and its
allies, the fact that the U.S. government will not disclose even who it has
discussed such agreements with will surely raise eyebrows. For instance, if
the United States were to have only negotiated agreements with other Five
31
Jennifer Daskal, Privacy and Security Across Borders, 128 Yale L.J. F. 1029, 1038
(2019).
32
CLOUD Act §105, 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(1).
33
Id. at § 2523(J).
34
See, e.g., Joint Statement Announcing United States and Australian Negotiation of a
CLOUD Act Agreement by U.S. Attorney General William Barr and Minister for Home
Affairs Peter Dutton, DEP’T OF JUST. (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/jointstatement-announcing-united-states-and-australian-negotiation-cloud-act-agreement-us.
35
Leo Kelion, NSA-GCHQ Snowden Leaks: A Glossary of Key Terms, BRITISH BROAD.
CORP. (Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-25085592.
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Eyes nations, or with Israel, but not nations such as Germany and France,
this would undoubtedly have an impact on international relations with the
United States, as well as American companies.
The effect is that the standards set out for the Attorney General to
follow are—much like the Pirate Code—mere guidelines rather than actual
standards.36 As the chief law enforcement officer, it is hard to imagine an
Attorney General protecting individual privacy interests at the expense of
more expansive law enforcement powers.
This is not to say that the part two of the CLOUD Act is an answer in
search of a problem. In the investigation underlying Microsoft, the U.S.
government made a conscious decision to pursue a warrant under the SCA,
despite the fact that the law was unsettled. There was another, wellestablished, method through which the government could have sought the
data that Microsoft had stored on its servers in Iceland: Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties (“MLAT”).37
The United States is a party to more than fifty bilateral MLATs, as
well as similar agreements with the European Union and foreign states.38
Requests made under MLATs are processed on a case-by-case basis. The
requesting state reaches out to the government with jurisdiction over the
property and then waits for the government to respond.39 This process is
slow, and particularly ill-suited with regards to digital evidence.40
Meanwhile, the number of MLAT requests has grown exponentially.41
Other than the general inefficiency and inefficacy of the MLAT
process, there was no reason why the government could not have used the
MLAT process in the case underlying Microsoft. The magistrate in the
District Court, in support of the issuance of the warrant, noted that the
“slow and laborious” MLAT procedures constituted such a “substantial”
36
See Sabrina A. Morris, Rethinking the Extraterritorial Scope of the United States’
Access to Data Stored by a Third Party, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 183, 213 (2018) (observing
that the statute “provides only factors, not requirements” that the Attorney General must
consider before approving a data sharing agreement and noting that the agreements are not
subject to judicial review)(citation omitted); Captain Hector Barbossa, PIRATES OF THE
CARIBBEAN: THE CURSE OF THE BLACK PEARL (Walt Disney Pictures and Jerry Bruckheimer
Films 2003) (40:50) (“The Code is more what you’d call guidelines than actual rules.”).
37
See Jonah Force Hill, Problematic Alternatives: MLAT Reform for the Digital Age,
HARV. L. SCH. NAT’L. SECURITY J. (Jan. 28, 2015), https://harvardnsj.org/2015/01/
problematic-alternatives-mlat-reform-for-the-digital-age/ for an overview of the MLAT
process.
38
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF LAW OF THE U.S. § 429
Reporter’s Note 1 (AM. LAW INST. 2018).
39
Daskal, supra note 31 at 1034.
40
Morris, supra note 36 at 203-04.
41
The Department of Justice estimates that number of MLAT requests “has increased
by nearly 60 percent and the number of requests for computer records has increased
ten-fold.” U.S. Dep’t of Just., FY 2015 Budget Request (July 13, 2014), retrieved from
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/07/13/mut-legal-assist.pdf
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burden on the government as to necessitate another option.42 A general
desire for another option is likely what motivated the government to forgo
the MLAT process and seek the content through a warrant; the ensuing
legal fight was worth fighting.
III. PRIVACY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AROUND THE WORLD
This section will examine the privacy law landscape in the European
Union and China. While it may seem like an odd paring at first glance,
contrasting privacy law schemes between these two jurisdictions
specifically helps illuminate how government law enforcement’s interests
can work to thwart even the most comprehensive privacy protections.
A. Data Privacy Law in China and the European Union
In 2016, the European Union passed its landmark privacy legislation,
the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”).43 It has been recognized
as one of the strongest and most comprehensive attempts by a government
to safeguard individuals’ personal data.44 The GDPR is part of a larger trend
of the European Union’s attempts to help protect the privacy of its citizens.
The Data Protection Directive, adopted by the E.U. in the 1995, required
“each of the twenty-eight Member States to enact national legislation that
protects ‘the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in
particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal
data.’” 45 In 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union recognized a
“right to be forgotten.”46
Despite the relative inaction on the part of the United States, the
European Union is not the only jurisdiction which has sought to enact
strong statutory individual privacy protections. China has enacted privacy
laws that, on their face, are as comprehensive as the GDPR.47 Though there
are many reasons why the Chinese privacy laws have not received the same
attention—the EU is a first mover and a longtime ally of the United
States—it must also be due, at least in part, to China’s past abuses in this
area.48 Simply put, it is easy to dismiss Chinese privacy protections because
42
In re A Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Orin S. Kerr, The Next
Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 373, 409 (2014)).
43
Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L119).
44
The EU General Data Protection Regulation, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 6, 2018,
5:00 AM). https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/06/eu-general-data-protection-regulation#.
45
Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Towards a Global Data Privacy Standard,
71 Fla. L. Rev. 365, 373-74 (2019) (citing Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 1).
46
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 2014
E.C.R. 317 (2014).
47
Griffen Thorne, GDPR Meets its Match . . . in China, CHINA LAW BLOG (July 14,
2019), https://www.chinalawblog.com/2019/07/gdpr-meets-its-match-in-china.html.
48
See, e.g., Nithin Coca, China’s Xinjiang Surveillance is the Dystopian Future Nobody
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many believe that the Chinese government, and perhaps the Chinese culture
broadly, traditionally do not value individual privacy.49
However, this attitude towards Chinese privacy legislation misses the
point. In some respects, the Chinese law places even greater burdens on
providers before they collect and use personal data, especially with regards
to gaining user consent.50 Companies doing business in China, including
those from the United States or European Union, must comply with these
standards just as they must with the GDPR in Europe. Both the GDPR and
Chinese law require companies with no physical presence in the respective
jurisdictions to comply with the law.51 It is true that the goal of Chinese
privacy law may not so much be the protection of privacy itself but the goal
of the Chinese government to protect its internet and domestic providers
from foreign companies.52 This does not change the fact that these
standards still have the impact of protecting the data privacy of its citizens,
though it may not be the driving force.
Further, it is not yet clear whether the GDPR will be able to achieve its
lofty goals. Despite its history of legal protections for individual data
privacy, such regulations in Europe have not always proven effective.53
Wants, ENGADGET (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.engadget.com/2018-02-22-china-xinjiangsurveillance-tech-spread.html (observing that the Chinese government shut off the internet
following deadly protests in 2009); Chris Buckley, Crackdown on Bloggers is Mounted by
China, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/world/asia/chinacracks-down-on-online-opinion-makers.html (discussing the arrest of bloggers critical of the
Chinese government).
49
See, e.g., Xiaofeng Lin, A Dangerous Game: China’s Big Data Advantage and How
the U.S. Should Respond, 2020 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 253, 269-70 (2020) (contrasting
the American concept of “privacy as a fundamental human right” with the traditional
Chinese cultural view that privacy “has a negative connotation”); Tiffany Li, Zhou Zhou &
Jill Bronfman, Saving Face: Unfolding the Screen of Chinese Privacy Law, J.L., INFO., &
SCI., 5 (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2826087 (“The idea of an individual
having the right to an intangible concept like privacy . . . was [] relatively unheard of.”); Ann
Bartow, The Second Wave of Global Privacy Protection: Privacy Laws and Privacy Levers:
Online Surveillance Versus Economic Development in the People’s Republic of China, 74
OHIO ST. L.J. 853, 856 (2013) (observing that “longstanding social norms” thwart individual
freedom protections and that “Chinese citizens participate in a culture of peer observation
and orchestrated scrutiny”); cf. Clay Chandler & David Z. Morris, China’s Lax Attitude
About Privacy is Shifting – Data Sheet, FORTUNE (Aug. 20, 2019, 2:03 PM),
https://fortune.com/2019/08/20/china-privacy-data-sheet/ (observing that the traditional
notion that “Chinese culture generally doesn’t place the same value on privacy that Western
culture does” is changing); Harrison Jacobs, Chinese People Don’t Care About Privacy on
the Internet — Here’s Why, According to a Top Professor in China, INSIDER (June 26, 2018,
1:08 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/why-china-chinese-people-dont-care-aboutprivacy-2018-6 (comparing the more subdued reaction to revelations regarding misuse of
data in China to similar events in the United States and Europe that sparked outrage in part
because “[They] don’t have privacy in China traditionally”).
50
Thorne, supra note 47.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Neil Hodge, Privacy Advocate Schrems Foresees Lax Enforcement of GDPR,

224

Outsourcing the Police
41:213 (2021)

There are reasons to believe that the GDPR itself may suffer from some of
the same issues as the laws that came before it.54 Ultimately, it will take
some time before we know just how effective the GDPR will be. As with
any new law, the rights and duties of providers under the GDPR will
crystalize over time as people and companies challenge competing
interpretations and practices. To that end, there is reason to be bullish on
the real-world impact that the GDPR will ultimately have. Google is still
the largest lobbyist in the European Union and the United States.55
Meanwhile, at the other end of the spectrum, the GDPR has had an adverse
effect on European tech startups.56 Beyond the tech industry, there is
evidence that the GDPR has had a negative impact on the economy of the
European Union as a whole.57 This is all in addition to the direct cost to
European governments of enforcing the GDPR. Companies doing business
in the European Union, rather than risk being penalized for failing to
comply with the European Union, have overreported potential issues to
regulators.58 The result has been that regulators have struggled to keep up
with the increased workload under the GDPR.59 Despite all of the costs, the
European people—the people the GDPR was enacted to protect—do not
believe that they have any more control over their data, nor has it increased
trust on the internet.60
Given the many costs of the GDPR, it is easy to see how the law may
fail to live up to its potential. A foreseeable outcome of the law is to restrict
the growth of new tech companies in Europe and large providers such as
Facebook and Google are able to use their influence and resources to either
change or avoid the law. A common criticism of large tech companies is the
practice of buying startups and preventing them from growing into
COMPLIANCE WEEK (Nov. 28, 2018 3:30 AM), https://www.complianceweek.com/dataprivacy/privacy-advocate-schrems-foresees-lax-enforcement-of-gdpr/24736.article
(observing that the EU data protection directive that proceeded the GDPR was ineffective as
it made more financial sense for companies to ignore the law and pay the penalties).
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2019).
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See generally Jian Jia et al., The Short-Run Effects of GDPR on Technology Venture
Investment (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 25248, Nov. 8, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3278912.
57
Merrill Corp., GDPR Burdens Hinder M&A Transactions in the EMEA Region, (Nov.
13, 2018), https://www.merrillcorp.com/us/en/company/news/press-releases/gdpr-burdenshinder-m-a-transactions-in-the-emea-region.html.
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Catherine Stupp, European Privacy Regulators Find Their Workload Expands Along
With Authority, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 12, 2019 7:44 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
european-privacy-regulators-find-their-workload-expands-along-with-authority11555061402.
59
Id.
60
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competitors.61 Indeed, to this point the GDPR has resulted in Google
receiving more user data than it did before.62 If this trend continues, the
negative impact on the economy as a whole does not reverse, public
sentiment does not change, and the cost to regulators remains high,
countries in the European Union may start underenforcing the GDPR, just
as has happened with previous data privacy schemes in the European
Union. It is possible that this is already occurring. At least three member
states of the European Union have yet to fully adapt their national
legislation to the standards required by the GDPR.63
Of course, it is still early. It is possible for the European Union to
work out the kinks. Even if the GDPR does not accomplish everything it set
out to, as the most comprehensive privacy legislation in the world, it may
still achieve quite a lot. On the other hand, acknowledging that the future of
the GDPR is uncertain is also acknowledging there is a possibility that it
might fail. It then becomes appropriate to wonder what is so special about
the GDPR that has earned it praise from privacy advocates who, at the same
time, have not quite embraced similar privacy protections in China. There
are any number of explanations. China has long criticized the Western
media of being biased against China.64 Though western bias almost
certainly plays some role, another factor is likely the motivation behind the
laws themselves. The motivation behind the GDPR is the protection of
individual personal privacy, whereas the motivation behind Chinese privacy
law is the protection of Chinese interests.65 There seems to be a belief that,
because the guiding principle behind the GDPR is the protection of
individuals, that enforcement and adjudication of the GDPR will, on the
whole, reflect this principle.
On the other hand, where the Chinese government is motivated by
protecting China, any conflicts will be resolved in favor of the government
rather than individual privacy interests. Personal privacy concerns have not
prevented the Chinese government from establishing an expansive
surveillance state.66 Much of the infrastructure behind the current
surveillance framework in China relies on its ability to filter and control the
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internet.67 The Chinese government has worked towards developing a social
credit system—an attempt to place a value on each citizen’s social and
political behavior—by keeping track of each communication, transaction,
and website visit made by its citizens.68 Similar data collection has fueled
China’s predictive policing efforts.69 Enabled by its vast surveillance
network, law enforcement assigns a “score” for certain activities, such as
praying regularly or leaving the house through the back door, and arrests
people with scores below a certain threshold or people deemed threats by an
algorithm.70 Such efforts make it clear that, however concerned the Chinese
government is with protecting the personal information of its citizens, it is
more concerned with protecting the Chinese government.
Though there is certainly room to debate the true motivations of the
EU and China in enacting their otherwise similarly comprehensive privacy
protection schemes, it is clear that there is more skepticism of China’s
efforts because they prioritize state interests over those of individuals. This,
however, assumes that the European Union, and by extension the GDPR, is
not susceptible of falling into the same trap. After all, the GDPR does
contain broad exceptions related to law enforcement and national security.71
The Chinese have also implicated law enforcement and national security
concerns in order to justify their surveillance schemes.72 It may be easy to
say that the E.U. and China are so fundamentally different that the
inadequacy of Chinese privacy law to protect it from the Chinese
government itself is a uniquely Chinese phenomenon. To a certain extent,
that is certainly true.73 However, it would be a mistake to assume that the
GDPR could not be similarly thwarted in the name of law enforcement and
national security.74
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B. Government Access to Data in the EU and China
For all the GDPR may do to protect the data privacy of individuals, it
is unlikely to curtail large scale government surveillance.75 As discussed
above, there are a number of reasons that the GDPR may be underenforced
by member states. That is even before considering the competing interests
of law enforcement. Though law enforcement and national security interests
are unlikely to completely handicap the GDPR, it seems likely that it will
prevent the GDPR from having the far-reaching impact that many privacy
advocates hope for.
There is evidence that the European Union is willing to sacrifice
privacy protections for individuals, in the name of law enforcement and
national security. In 2017, the United States entered into an agreement, the
E.U.-U.S. Privacy Shield, that allows for companies to freely transfer user
data from the European Union to the United States.76 Though the E.U.-U.S.
Privacy Shield does not directly implicate national security or law
enforcement—it allows providers to transfer data freely between the two
jurisdictions—the E.U. entering the agreement can be seen as an
endorsement of the surveillance schemes in the United States.77 At the very
least, it indicates that the E.U., or at least individual member states, may
establish similar programs without running afoul of the GDPR.
As part of entering into the agreement with the United States, the
European Union stated that the agreement was prudent because the United
States had sufficient privacy protections in place.78 The E.U. reached this
conclusion despite the existence of multiple government surveillance
programs that fall well short of E.U. privacy protection requirements.79 As
discussed above, the citizens of the United States do not have any general
right to personal privacy. To the extent that there are Fourth Amendment
protections, they do not extend outside of the jurisdiction of the United
States and would offer no protection to non-U.S. citizen users in Europe.80
The Privacy Shield allows for companies to freely transfer user data from
the European Union to the United States. United States law “empowers the
intelligence agencies to ‘target’ non-U.S. persons overseas for warrantless
telephone or internet monitoring.”81 This means that the United States
08/european-privacy-laws-may-be-hampering-those-catching-terrorists.
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government can request, without a court order, the user data that private
companies collect on users within the European Union.82
It is possible, if not likely, that the European Union entered into the
Privacy Shield agreement because it could not afford to sever ties with the
United States—not because it actually believed the United States had
sufficient privacy protections in place. The European Union has clearly
been dissatisfied with the privacy protections offered for E.U. citizens by
the United States, to the point where the European Union threatened to pull
out of the agreement.83 Two years later, despite uneven progress at best, the
Privacy Shield remains in place, calling into question how serious the EU is
about U.S. compliance.84
Another reason that the European Union may not be willing to
seriously object is that, in spite of all of its efforts to protect the privacy of
its citizens from abuse by providers, it does not have similar reservations
about government use of the same data. While the European Union was
enacting the GDPR and E.U. Courts were deciding cases like Google v.
Spain,85 member states of the E.U. were also building their own mass
surveillance programs which were, in turn, legitimized by E.U. courts.86
Also, the European Union is currently attempting to answer the same
jurisdictional question that Part 2 of the CLOUD Act was intended to solve.
The European Union’s proposal regulating e-evidence87 grants jurisdiction
over a person’s data when a requesting government otherwise has
jurisdiction over that person, regardless of where the data is stored. Despite
the GDPR having just gone into effect, the e-evidence regulation as it
stands is almost completely devoid of any meaningful protections for
personal privacy.88 Private companies have spoken out against the eevidence regulation for not protecting fundamental privacy rights.89 Some
82
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privacy advocates have even expressed concern that the e-evidence
regulation could lead to de-facto “privatization of law enforcement.”90
There is some evidence that we are seeing the beginning of this kind of
privatization of law enforcement with regard to national security. The
European Union has suggested, similar to China, that the tech industry has
an obligation to develop tools that can automatically detect and remove
content that may incite terrorism.91 Further, the European Union has said
“subject to appropriate safeguards, the availability of data should be
secured” to preserve government access to electronic evidence.92
None of this is to say that the regulations and law enforcement data
collection schemes in the European Union are exceedingly draconian. In
China, any tech provider that collects personal data must also store the data
in China.93 Though the Chinese government insists that this is in order to
protect the privacy of the Chinese people, it is generally understood to
“give the government unrestricted access to almost all personal data.”94
Chinese tech companies—from online retailers and search engines to social
media and messaging providers—routinely turn over data to the Chinese
government.95 The Chinese government also has the ability to target and
suspend social media accounts that contain key terms.96 The state has also
asked companies to develop software that can use data collected to predict
terrorist attacks.97
Again, these programs are far more draconian than anything in place
in the European Union or United States. But, as tempting as it may be, it
would be a mistake to believe that such programs could not exist in the
West because we have a fundamentally different understanding of
individual rights than China. As true as that may be, it has not always been
enough to keep Western governments from engaging in surveillance and
data collection programs that would be impossible if those governments, or
at least the people who ran the programs, placed any real importance in the

European Law Enforcement Authorities’ Access to Data, MICROSOFT (Nov. 6, 2019),
https://blogs.microsoft.com/eupolicy/2019/11/06/e-evidence-fundamental-rights-protectionsneeded/.
90
Katitza Rodriguez, A Tale of Two Poorly Designed Cross-Border Data Access
Regimes, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/04/
tale-two-poorly-designed-cross-border-data-access-regimes.
91
European Council Conclusions on Security and Defence, 22/06/2017, EUROPEAN
COUNCIL (June 22, 2017), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/
06/22/euco-security-defence/.
92
Id.
93
Sara Xia, China Data Protection Regulations (CDPR), CHINA LAW BLOG (May 20,
2018), https://www.chinalawblog.com/2018/05/china-data-protection-regulations-cdpr.html.
94
China Invents the Digital Totalitarian State, supra note 68.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.

230

Outsourcing the Police
41:213 (2021)

privacy rights of individuals.98 The only absolute barrier that exists is that in
the European Union and the United States, governments do not have the
same degree of control over the tech providers in their jurisdictions as the
Chinese government does over Chinese companies. In China, technology
companies are, in many ways, de facto arms of the state and cannot refuse
to cooperate with the Chinese government.99 As such state control does not
exist in the West, providers can oppose new regulation that may be harmful
to their consumers, and by extension, the companies themselves.100
However, this requires the tech companies to be willing to stand up to the
government rather than conduct the surveillance on the government’s
behalf. To the extent that what separates the West from China is that
companies in China “have no meaningful ability to tell the Chinese
Communist Party ‘no,’”101 it requires that the companies in the West who
can say no do so when necessary.
IV. PRIVATE PROVIDERS AND GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE
Thus far, we have seen what government has required, or can require,
of providers in order to ensure individuals some measure of privacy with
regards to their personal data. We have also seen how law enforcement and
national security interests can be antagonistic to attempts by government to
protect the privacy of its people. At this point, it is important to examine the
role that the providers themselves have in the struggle between privacy and
law enforcement interests.
Tech providers play an active role in shaping public policy in a wide
98
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range of areas, including privacy and law enforcement.102 In 2017, Google
spent more money on lobbying than any other company in the United
States.103 In the European Union, Google engaged in a “hiring blitz” of
former government officials with the aim to “boost its influence in
European policy circles.”104 Other tech providers have followed Google’s
lead.105 The role of tech providers in this sphere is not limited to trying to
shape policy through traditional lobbying—they are also indispensable to
modern law enforcement and national security efforts.106
In mid-2013, Edward Snowden, an employee of the National Security
Agency (NSA), leaked highly classified information which revealed
extensive global surveillance programs, many of which were run by the
NSA.107 Snowden collected about 1.7 million intelligence files108
documenting the surveillance practices of the United States and the rest of
the Five Eyes alliance. In particular, the Snowden disclosures detailed the
PRISM surveillance program, a program under which the NSA collected
electronic communications through various U.S. internet companies; in
some cases, with the help of the providers themselves.109 The surveillance
102
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programs revealed in the Snowden disclosures were merely part of an
overall trend of law enforcement’s reliance on third party providers.
Early examples of government relying on private companies to assist
with surveillance can be seen with the enactment of so-called “lawful
interception” laws in the 1990s. As telecommunications networks became
increasingly digital, law enforcement wiretaps required the cooperation of
providers as they could no longer simply plug into a phone line—literally
tap the wire—and listen in on phone calls.110 In the mid-1990s,
governments all over the world—including the United States, United
Kingdom and European Union—enacted legislation that imposed an
obligation on providers to provide law enforcement access to their network
and support government interception of data.111 These regulations were
eventually expanded or supplemented to require providers to store metadata
and turn it over to law enforcement.112 Though law enforcement had long
relied on the cooperation of third party providers, this was the first time an
affirmative burden was placed on private companies to provide access to
law enforcement.113
As technology has progressed and more personal data is stored
electronically, the U.S. government has moved quickly to ensure they did
not have any interruptions in access.114 Though, the government has not
simply needed to keep pace with technological advancements. The supply
of personal data available to the government also needed to keep pace with
an increase in demand. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the
U.S. government greatly expanded the power of the federal government in
the name of combatting terrorism.115 It is this “militarized demand” for user
data that has enabled providers to act without fear of sanction from of law
enforcement because the interests of tech providers and law enforcement—
increased supply—are often aligned.116
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In some respects, the U.S. government is actually incentivized to rely
on private companies to conduct intelligence gathering for law
enforcement.117 There is the obvious benefit to the government that, by
soliciting data from various third parties, the government can collect more
information than it could if it were doing the collection on its own.
However, there are legal benefits as well. Professor Jon Michaels observed
that by entering into informal agreements with private parties, law
enforcement could avoid congressional or judicial oversight.118 Private
parties, which did not have to operate within the statutory and regulatory
framework required of law enforcement, gave law enforcement greater
access to user information with fewer legal hurdles to clear along the
way.119
The Five Eyes publicly touted its collaboration with providers such as
Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and Twitter to address online terrorism.120
The European Union also announced that it expects the tech industry to
develop technology and tools to help detect and remove online content that
could incite terrorism.121 Practically, governments must cooperate with
private actors in order to police the internet if for no other reason than the
sheer impossibility of the task.
It has generally been accepted that the loss of privacy is simply
payment in exchange for the use of many modern services. Facebook,
Google, and numerous other tech providers rely on a privacy-for-service
business model; they do not charge their users for their service, but instead
monetize user data.122 However, there is evidence that this bargain is
becoming strained. An overwhelming majority of people in the United
States believe that there should be stronger privacy protections, including a
“right to be forgotten,” and Americans are divided on whether it is
acceptable for law enforcement specifically to use or collect their personal
data.123 As a result, not only must tech providers now comply with
117
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increased privacy legislation around the world, but they must also reassure
consumers that they can use tech services and products and maintain some
level of privacy. Thus, providers are fighting a battle over control of users’
personal data on two separate fronts.
One solution for tech providers is to repackage this data and sell it to
the government. Given that the public appears to be less skeptical of the
government collecting and processing their personal data, it seems that,
even if it does not improve the public’s opinion of tech providers, it may
not have a negative impact.124 On the other front, there is little reason to
believe that governments will object with any real force to this strategy. In
the United States, law enforcement has used tools developed by tech
providers that scan social media for potential threats.125 Beyond simply
using tools that private tech companies have developed, the United States
has taken an active role in funding these efforts, including providing
funding to startups that create “threat scores” based on social media
activity.126 This phenomenon is, of course, not restricted to small startups
operating in this niche space. Tech companies based in the United States
have helped the Chinese build their surveillance infrastructure.127 Facebook
CEO Mark Zuckerberg even suggested that artificial intelligence could
monitor private messages and flag suspicious activity, such as potential
planning of terrorist attacks.128
The collection of personal data is not limited to privacy-for-service
providers. Internet service providers—ostensibly fee-for-service
providers—armed with an expansive view of the entire web, have
positioned themselves to compete with entities such as Google and
Facebook for surveillance revenues.129 In 2016, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) enacted rules that gave individuals
control over how ISPs used their personal data.130 However, these privacy
protections were short lived. In 2017, Congress passed legislation that
rolled back the FCC rules and prevented it from creating similar rules in the
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future.131 The result is that users are now paying ISPs for the privilege of
having the whole of their internet activity available for sale, and, if history
is any guide, law enforcement will be among those lining up to purchase
it.132
Providers also work directly with law enforcement, rather than simply
selling or repurposing data it collects for other purposes. One of the more
well-known efforts is the deployment of facial recognition.133 Deployment
of facial recognition in the United States has been uneven. Some
jurisdictions and even private companies have restricted its use by law
enforcement over ethical concerns.134 Other jurisdictions have used facial
recognition software that scrapes billions of images from the internet and
compares them to footage captured by security cameras to identify possible
matches.135 There are also ambitions plans to expand the use of facial
recognition at the federal level where it is currently used by the Customs
and Border Patrol.136 Law enforcement is not merely using the technology
to identify suspects of crimes; they are also using it to identify protestors,
journalists, and track immigrants.137 A similar technology, automatic
license plate readers, allows law enforcement to track people in real time.138
131
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Further, because the data is often stored for years at a time—by both law
enforcement and private contractors who monetize the data—it can be used
to look backwards and see where people were after the fact, not unlike the
use of cell site location data that the Supreme Court has determined requires
a warrant due to the privacy interests at stake.139
Among the most sophisticated tools law enforcement uses are the ones
that enable it to process the data it collects. One such platform, Palantir,
was developed for counterinsurgency efforts in warzones and has been
adapted for use by civilian law enforcement at the federal and local
levels.140 Palantir allows law enforcement to filter through millions of
records in a matter of minutes using only basic information.141 The data
filtered by Palantir comes from various law enforcement databases, as well
as external databases that include billions of records including things like
utility bills, credit card information, retail customer lists, and social media
data.142 All of this is just scratching the surface. Law enforcement is
currently collecting far more data than it has a use for, and the largest police
departments are using the most sophisticated tools.143 With time, new tools
will inevitably be developed that make use of the surplus data, and will
eventually filter into more law enforcement agencies.
As long as governments are willing to participate in the monetization
of user data by either paying for the data itself, or funding tools developed
specifically for law enforcement, there is little reason for providers to
change their practices. This is because, from the perspective of the
providers, privacy is not a right, but a commodity.144 Though this may be a
disquieting reality, it may also be a reason to be somewhat optimistic. To
the extent that the “right” to privacy is for sale, providers can lose out on
business where they cannot guarantee user privacy. American tech
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139
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companies alone lost billions of dollars in the immediate aftermath of the
NSA leaks with billions more in losses projected over the following
decade.145 Tech companies outside of the United States have successfully
advertised that they do not have an American presence, taking business
from their American competitors. Electronic communications providers
have lost business as a result of United States surveillance and data
collection practices.146 Mark Zuckerberg himself was highly critical of the
Obama Administration’s reaction to the Snowden leaks because of the
impact it had on Facebook’s business.147 Even non-tech companies have
suffered as a direct result of the Snowden leaks.148
There is evidence that tech companies, even those with spotty track
records when it comes to user privacy, recognize that they must take at least
some steps to protect their users’ privacy beyond the protections required
by law. Mark Zuckerberg, at least publicly, abandoned his plans to mine
private messages for potential terror plots.149 Facebook, as owner of the
popular WhatsApp communications app, has also recently filed a lawsuit
against an Israeli company for breaking through its encryption
safeguards.150 Amazon and Microsoft suspended the use of their facial
recognition software by law enforcement over ethical concerns and IBM
stopped offering facial recognition software altogether.151 The largest tech
companies in the United States are constantly trying to expand their
presence in even the most basic and necessary aspects of day-to-day life.
Facebook has been developing its own currency in the face of criticism
from both private and public sectors.152 Given the typical users of
cryptocurrency, its success very much depend on having strong protections
in place for its users, especially to the extent that it requires standing up to
the government.153 Google had to table a joint project with the government
145
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to store medical records—specifically x-ray scans—over privacy
concerns.154 Though the program was compliant with federal privacy laws,
it called into question the extent to which the tech giant can protect user
data privacy.155
Even so, the public remains wary that tech providers can adequately
protect their personal information. As a result, efforts by tech providers to
influence potential government privacy initiatives, such as legislation, are
likely to be met with skepticism. But, where their interests align, the
general public and tech providers would do well to work together to ensure
the effectiveness of any new privacy legislation. Though public pressure
can force Congress to act, pressure alone is likely insufficient to ensure that
the resulting legislation is effective, or achieves the public’s desired ends.
For example, in the 1970s public outrage precipitated FISA, the act at
the heart of so many privacy issues that we face today.156 Congress enacted
the USA FREEDOM Act in response to public pressure following the
Snowden disclosures.157 Clearly, public pressure can force Congress to act.
However, mere action is not enough. The actions Congress takes must
actually move the ball forward when it comes to protecting, or in some
cases even creating the privacy rights of individuals. Any comprehensive
privacy legislation, like the GDPR or CCPA, will be extremely complex.
As a result, it is likely that many important details of such legislation will
be lost on the general public.158
Tech providers, on the other hand, will have the required
sophistication to understand the impact of new legislation. For better or
worse, they also have experience lobbying the government to get what they
want. If tech providers can be convinced that what helps the general
public—their customer base—helps them as well, the chances that new
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privacy legislation will be effective rise exponentially.
Ultimately, tech companies seek to maximize profits and shareholder
value. If the public can make it worthwhile for these companies to protect
their data, there is reason to be optimistic that they will do so. In some
cases, tech companies have even taken the first step by standing up to law
enforcement while making their case to the public. Apple has resisted
assisting the FBI with breaking through the encryption on iPhones as part of
terrorism investigations, with Apple CEO Tim Cook making an
impassioned public statement in defense of Apple’s stance.159 Conversely,
former Attorney General Bill Barr insisted that tech companies are catering
to criminals by offering shelter from government surveillance.160 In making
his own case to the public, former A.G. Barr asked “Do we want to live in a
society like that?”161 Barr, of course, does not think we do. It remains to be
seen whether the people agree.
V. CONCLUSION
Data privacy will become a larger issue in the United States. What
remains to be seen is how effective attempts to create legal privacy
protections will be. At the state level, the most comprehensive effort in the
United States to extend legal protections for individual data privacy, the
California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”), borrowed heavily from the
GDPR.162 As a result, it shares many of its vulnerabilities.163 At the federal
level, however, there is little reason to expect Congress to take up the issue
in the foreseeable future.164 Any progress made in the courts is likely to be
159
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slow and uneven.165 Should the Supreme Court address the issue, lower
courts and advocates on both sides will still have to figure out how to
interpret any new law, even if the Court expands privacy protections.166 All
the while, technology will continue to advance.
Regardless of where data privacy protections come from, in the
foreseeable future it is almost certain that they will not come from the
executive branch. Much of the modern data collection apparatus was
created by the George W. Bush administration,167 expanded under the
Obama administration,168 then maintained under the Trump
administration.169 It seems unlikely that President Biden will depart from
policies embraced by the Obama Administration. While it can be hard to
predict technological advancements over the next five years, we can be
certain that the executive’s goal will be to ensure that law enforcement is
able to keep pace and maintain its broad surveillance and data collection
programs.
Americans will have to confront that it is likely impossible to have
meaningful personal data privacy protections while maintaining current law
enforcement and national security surveillance programs. This is not a new
struggle. In recent years, advocates for stronger individual liberties have coopted Benjamin Franklin’s assertion that “Those who would give up
essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither
Liberty or Safety.”170 Such an absolutist position is untenable, and, it turns
out, not what Benjamin Franklin was endorsing at the time.171 Rather,
165
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Franklin understood that the real struggle was to find a correct balance
between liberty and safety.172 Finding the right balance requires honesty
about what the problem is and what effect privacy laws will have.
It is easy to dismiss the totalitarian surveillance state in China as a
uniquely Chinese problem that could not happen in the United States or
Europe. An obvious difference is that the Chinese Communist Party is the
paramount authority in China and has absolute authority over many Chinese
institutions, including law enforcement.173 Further, the CCP uses its vast
surveillance capabilities to commit human rights atrocities that are
incomparable to anything in the United States or European Union. Via tens
of millions of cameras, China uses facial recognition and “gait recognition”
to monitor and identify political dissidents and minority groups—
particularly Tibetans and Uighurs.174 This has enabled China to ultimately
detain over one million Uighurs and other Muslims in internment camps
designed to erase religious and ethnic identities.175 For its part, China
argues that the indoctrination of the Uighurs—officially declared genocide
by the United States—serves legitimate law enforcement purposes.176 This
fits in with what China sees as the purpose of law enforcement generally.
Law enforcement in China does not merely protect public safety—it is also
instrumental in suppressing opposition to the CCP.177 This extends beyond
the targeting of specific “threats” to the Party—i.e. political opposition—
and to initiatives, such as social credit scores, designed to ensure the loyalty
of the general public.178
However, it would be a mistake to dismiss comparisons between the
surveillance tactics of law enforcement in the United States and China on
the grounds that, whatever problems exist in the United States, genocide is
not one of them. Facial recognition is used by law enforcement in the
(July 15, 2011), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-ben-franklin-really-said.
172
Eugene Volokh, Liberty, Safety, and Benjamin Franklin, THE WASH. POST (Nov. 11,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/11/11/libertysafety-and-benjamin-franklin/.
173
See United States Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
for
2019
–
China
1
(Mar.
11,
2020),
https://www.state.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/CHINA-INCLUSIVE-2019-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf
(describing China as an authoritarian state where the CCP is the paramount authority and
how law enforcement are under the authority of the CCP and the Central Military
Commission, controlled by Xi Jinpaing), 23-26 (outlining how various law enforcement
bodies in China use surveillance).
174
Id. at 23.
175
Id. at 1; duPont, supra note 133.
176
Edward Wong and Chris Buckley, U.S. Says China’s Repression of Uighurs is
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
19,
‘Genocide’,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/19/us/politics/trump-china-xinjiang.html.
177
See generally China Country Report, supra note 173 (discussing treatment of political
dissidents, disfavored minorities, and human rights activists by law enforcement).
178
Id. at 24-25; see also China invents the digital totalitarian state, supra note 68.

242

Outsourcing the Police
41:213 (2021)

United States to identify protestors, immigrants, and even journalists.179
License plate readers track citizens in real time.180 Predictive policing
initiatives in the United States, such as threat scores, bear a strong
resemblance to similar initiatives in China.181 And all of this just scratches
the surface. American law enforcement is focused on collecting as much
data as it can, and then figuring out how to use it later.182 Undoubtedly,
there are also surveillance initiatives in place that we have yet to learn
about.
These tools help law enforcement solve and deter crimes, though at the
expense of individual privacy. It would also be a mistake, however, to
ignore the impact of getting caught in the crosshairs simply because the
stakes are not as high as in China.183 Perhaps it is a bargain Americans are
willing to make.184 If so, we should be honest about the cost.
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